The annual Dubrovnik Dialogue-Conference in Cavtat, Croatia, has been a meeting place and forum for Parliamentarians from Southeast Europe for more than 18 years. The event in 2017 focused on the present challenges of integration and disintegration for Europe and the European Union. Around 45 members of parliaments from the region and from the European Parliament have come together in Cavtat and exchanged their views in a lively debate.

For the first time in its history, the Union is negotiating accession with some candidate countries while, at the same time, an exit with one of its current members. If we add to this the raising pressure along EU's external borders, coming from multiple geopolitical crises, we could say that Southeast Europe finds itself at the crossroad between two opposing processes that the EU is currently going through: integration and disintegration of the European Union. The 2017 Cavtat Conference addressed the question of the European Perspective for Southeast Europe in this environment.
Introduction

The annual Cavtat-Conference, the Dubrovnik-Process, has become a meeting place and forum for parliamentarians from South-East-Europe. For more than 18 years, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been inviting members of parliaments from all South-East-European countries, the European Parliament and the German Bundestag. It has become a flagship activity of the Regional Dialogue for South-East-Europe of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

In the beginning, the conference was closely linked to the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe and the role of parliaments in this initiative. The Dubrovnik-Process has then addressed a wide range of topics connected to the political, social and economic developments and the prospects and progress of EU accession of the countries in the region. Recently, we have started to focus on common European challenges for all countries involved – be they already members of the European Union or not. In 2016, we have focused on Migration and Integration – the wave of refugees that passed through South-East-Europe on the Western Balkan Route as well as the emigration from the region towards North-Western-Europe.

The Cavtat-Conference in 2017 focused on the current challenges for the European Union and its repercussions for South-East-Europe. With the decision for Brexit, for the first time a member state of the European Union will actually leave the union. With the developments in Turkey – the conference took place just one week before the referendum on constitutional change in Turkey – the accession process with this South-East-European neighbor is getting more and more difficult and has practically come to a standstill. Nevertheless, there is also further integration amongst the member states as well as the opening of new negation chapters with candidate countries. We are experiencing processes of disintegration as well as integration of the European Union.

These developments have effects on South-East-Europe. The first panel of the 2017 Cavtat-Conference focused on the repercussion of Brexit with an input from political analyst Steven Blockmans from Brussels. The most vivid discussion took place on the second panel dedicated to the EU accession process. The discussion was inspired by an opening statement from Goran Svilanovic, General Secretary of the Regional Cooperation Council. The third and last session asked the question, weather Turkey belongs to the European Union. Inputs came from the Croatian political scientist Dejan Jovic and the Turkish member of Parliament Zeynep Altiok. The keynote speech on “Integration and Disintegration of the European Union” was delivered by Tonino Picula, Croatian Member of the European Parliament. Both Dusan Relijic from the German think tank SWP and Chrisoph Zöpel, former Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany and now advisor to the PES President, commented on Tonino Picula’s input.

The challenges for the European Union are big. In order to find common solutions, it will be crucial to understand the different perspectives on these challenges and to form a common standpoint. We hope that with the Dubrovnik process, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung can make a meaningful contribution for Socialdemocrats and their friends to better understand the respective views and to find common positions. For this purpose we want to make the discussion of the 2017 Cavtat-Conference available for you. In this documentation you will find a summary of the debates as well as Dean Jovic’s paper on Turkey.

Dr. Max Brändle
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Director Regional Office for Croatia and Slovenia
Summary of the Conference

MATTEO BONOMI

Integration and disintegration of the European Union. The European perspective for Southeast Europe

The Nobel Peace Prize delivered to the EU in 2012 really marked the end of one period of its history. The current challenges that the EU is facing are multiple and complex and cannot be solved overnight. The recent 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the triggering of Article 50 of Treaty on European Union (TEU) by the United Kingdom are two central events of these new times, which while reflecting the increased uncertainty of the future of the Union are also shaping the way forward.

Within this context, Southeast Europe and the European perspective for non-EU countries in the region are among those issues that have to be addressed. In fact, the Balkans are today in a unique situation. For the first time in its history, the Union is negotiating accession with some candidate countries while, at the same time, an exit with one of its current members. If we add to this the raising pressure along EU’s external borders, coming from multiple geopolitical crises, we could say that Southeast Europe finds itself at the crossroad between two opposing processes that the EU is currently going through: enlargement versus shrinking and squeezing.

Current events, thus, have raised the strategic weight of the Balkans for the EU as well as the importance of the EU as an anchor of stability and democratic transformation in the region. This is particularly true if we consider the mounting interests of several geopolitical actors in Southeast Europe, starting from Russia and Turkey, and the non-liberal options that they could offer to the leaders of the countries in the region. If the EU membership stops to be perceived as a reachable goal for these countries, all kinds of turmoils could become possible.

At the same time, however, given all the challenges the EU is currently facing, the EU focus has been distracted and absorbed by dealing with its multiple internal crises. This has diminished EU’s internal push for further enlargement, as clearly signalled by European Commission President Juncker’s White Paper on the future of Europe. Out of five scenarios of how the Union could evolve by 2025, which are outlined there, only one, the unlikely ‘federal option’, could possibly mean that the
enlargement will be a high priority in the European agenda. Hence, it is pivotal to swiftly spell out and tackle the implications for Southeast Europe of the choices that the EU and the member states are making today, to keep the process alive and continue to build mutual trust, from both sides, on the capacity of EU enlargement policy to deliver.

The conference, then, has given a contribution in this direction by focusing on three crucial nodes where the future of the Union interlinks with the European perspective for Southeast Europe. Firstly, it has focused on the consequences of Brexit negotiations and the UK leaving the EU for the aspiring EU members in the Balkans, looking at what kinds of risks, but also few opportunities, this could open. Secondly, it has addressed how the current uncertainty on the future of the Union are negatively affecting the European perspective for Southeast Europe and what can be done to preserve the enlargement process and bring about positive dynamics within the region. Lastly, it has spotlighted the dramatic developments that have been taking place in Turkey, its implications for EU-Turkish relations and for Southeast Europe.

How does Brexit affect the EU accession process in Southeast Europe?

On 29 March the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, triggered Article 50, officially starting a two-year countdown before the United Kingdom drops out. While it is too early to fully appreciate the implications of this process for EU enlargement and EU accession negotiations, especially considering the different directions that the Brexit withdrawal talks could take, it is important to move forward and make some preliminary considerations in order to start to square the circle. Under these premises, it could be arguably said that while the direct effects on enlargement policy of the United Kingdom leaving the EU should be limited, the major impact of Brexit on Southeast Europe could come as an amplifier to other on-going dynamics within the EU and the countries in the region themselves, bringing some risks but, potentially, also a few positive developments.

The United Kingdom, in fact, ceased to be champion of EU enlargement years ago, as it was already clear during David Cameron’s cabinets, leaving the leadership of this process to other countries, starting from Germany. Economic implications of Brexit for Southeast Europe are modest, given the long-term decline in UK-Western Balkans trade relations, which are now at approximately 5% of total trade. Moreover, the United Kingdom's role in the region in terms of a security provider is limited: it contributes around only 5% to EU military operations, approximately 3% to civilian missions and concentrates on regions other than Southeast Europe. A harsher direct consequence of Brexit could be on the EU enlargement budget, which could slightly diminish as a consequence of the loss of a net contributor to the general budget of the Union.
Nevertheless, the deeper implications of Brexit could be more subtle and indirect, building on internal trends within the EU and Western Balkan countries. In particular, Brexit could strengthen the on-going populist and illiberal tendencies across Europe, arming the credibility of the EU in asking for tough reforms in the enlargement countries and, so also, the developments of democracy in the Western Balkans. One negative indirect consequence that Brexit will centrally have on the region is that it will bring about new delays to the pre-accession process – which already seems in a state of suspended animation, with things moving too slowly – and that is per se detrimental to the process of enlargement.

At the same time, however, the fact that EU will contract before it will enlarge could also bring some positive changes. Brexit could spear a new reform drive within the EU, even a regrouping drive in the form of a more differentiated integration, which could see new developments in the EU, starting from the field of security and defence as a core group. This could help inject with new life-blood the enlargement policy as well, and could help define some priority areas for mutually beneficial cooperation between the enlargement countries and the EU. These areas could include cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, border control and movement of people or economic functional integration.

Notwithstanding these considerations, what will be really crucial is the path that Brexit negotiations are going to undertake. Whether the EU and the United Kingdom will find a deal and they go for a, so-called, 'hard' Brexit, the negotiation position of the EU in front of Southeast Europe could be further undermined, with secessionist winds blowing from Scotland across Europe, creating more instability in region. On the contrary, if withdrawal talks with United Kingdom advance well and lead to the creation of a ‘membership lite’ model of close relations with the EU, this could open for much more positive developments in the Balkans as well. In this case, the path towards differentiated integration within the EU could be fuelled, opening possibilities for advancing strengthened sectoral integration between the EU and the Balkan aspirants and, eventually, even offering an alternative model to full membership for those enlargement countries not interested or able to join.

The EU accession process in Southeast Europe

While Brexit is clearly a central event, it is just one ‘issue’ among several EU crises, which could be summed up as the challenge of counteracting the emergence of a regressive, fragmented and illiberal Europe and which clearly affects the
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The EU accession process. Under this context of increased uncertainty on the future of the Union, the enlargement counties in Southeast Europe have received rather negative messages from Brussels and EU capitals. Juncker’s speech that the EU will not have further enlargement during his term, while technically correct, has sent shocking waves throughout the region. Looking at the already mentioned, European Commission’s White Paper on the future of Europe, there are nearly no references to any enlargement at all. Then, the idea of a multi- or two-speeds Europe could open some new possibilities, but it has also been received very sceptically in the region. Finally, at 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, while the statement of the European Council has reaffirmed the EU perspective for Southeast Europe, it is also true that no regional leaders was invited to the European gathering. Moreover, what should be added to these mixed messages coming from the EU are quite negative developments in Southeast Europe itself. While the Western Balkan countries are at various stages of pre-accession, things are not moving at the pace that would be needed. The lack of speed has come with mutual mistrust and even some regressions in the enlargement countries. The recently published Freedom House yearly report indicates further drops in democratic standards in several countries, with Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, for instance, at their lowest levels since 2003 and 2001 respectively. Continuous political instabilities characterise also other countries, reflecting negatively on regional relations that appear today extremely tense, with a consistent number of bilateral issues still to be solved. All this is also leading to further disillusionment of voters within Southeast Europe, even if – with the important exception of Serbia – the overall support for EU accession is still high.

All the mentioned events have severely affected the accession process in Southeast Europe, and it is legitimate to ask how sincere are the commitments, on both sides, towards the goal of EU accession. It could seem that, in front of a not fully credible European perspective offered by the EU, the enlargement countries in Southeast Europe have reacted through a fake compliance in the pre-accession process. Regardless of these considerations, what is clear is that the EU perspective is no longer the latter-day Eldorado that inspires and justifies tightening of economic belts, tough administrative, regulatory, judiciary reforms at home, while local politicians are much more driven by internal political and economic problems as well as often-confrontational regional dynamics.

Despite this not encouraging picture, it is fundamental to ask as well what can be done to preserve the enlargement process moving and bring about more positive dynamics. While
'business as usual' seems not to be working when it comes to accession, there is the need to treat Southeast Europe as a priority within the European agenda and to have more political engagement by the Commission and the member states with the enlargement countries.

In order to keep the process moving, more has to be done to engage the enlargement countries in many fields, starting from dealing with a number of long-pending bilateral issues. The Brussels agreement on the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina is an example how things can develop positively, although slowly and carefully. Within this area, stronger assistance and engagement by the Commission would be needed, especially in solving bilateral issues between non-equals, meaning issues that involve EU aspirants and EU member states in the region. Their disruptive impact on regional dynamics has, for long, been proven in the case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and its name dispute with Greece, it has become evident in Serb-Croatian relations every time a new negotiation chapter has to be opened, and it could emerge for Albania if accession negotiations are going to start next September.

A second point to keep the process alive could be to engage all potential candidates that are still not able to open accession negotiations in the pre-screening of chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis, regarding judiciary and fundamental rights and justice, freedom and security. This could be a way to foster sectoral cooperation between the EU and Southeast Europe, pushing for democratic transformation in the region. In this respect, of course, a lot will depend on EU’s own credibility in dealing with illiberal tendencies within the Union and the member states themselves, as well as on which direction will the reform drive take within the Union regarding a more differentiated integration.

A last crucial point for the future of the European perspective of Southeast Europe will be the outcome of the Trieste meeting next July, the annual stop of the Berlin process, especially regarding the commitment made by the Western Balkan countries to move towards regional economic integration. While the initial idea of a customs union is probably too ambitious, legally extremely difficult and will not fly, it is extremely important to overcome national resistances and to move towards what is basically a CEFTA+ agreement. This would consist in making progresses in the removal of non-tariff barriers of the already liberalised trade in goods, and opening to the liberalization of services and labour through three flagship initiatives: the creation of a single information space (in terms of ICT interoperability and connectivity), a single labour market (through the automatic recognition of diplomas), and a single investment area (in the framework of a regional investment agreement).

Does Turkey belong in the EU?

The final focus of the conference was on the dramatic developments that have taken place in Turkey, its implications for EU-Turkish relations and for Southeast Europe.
Even before the failed military coup from last summer, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan started to develop an almost autocratic style one-man leadership, bringing the levels of relations between the EU and Turkey to their lowest point. After the failed coup, the situation worsened to the extreme, and the country started to focus on external issues and proclaim the state of emergency. The latest development includes sharp criticism and insults by President Erdoğan directed to the EU and some of the key member states, in particular Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, pointed as capitals of fascism and xenophobia. Following the final rush towards constitutional referendum on 16 April, proposing 18 amendments to the Turkish constitution, Turkey has definitively moved far away from any EU shared values and democratic frameworks.

While it is not possible to look at the deterioration of EU-Turkish relations without some regrets and a sense of missed opportunities for the mistakes committed on both sides, it is important that now the EU takes a common position on how to deal with Turkey and how to reorient its policy towards the country outside the classical accession framework. Any kind of reorientation of the EU policy should take into consideration several factors, including the autocratic ambitions of President Erdoğan and the dramatic worsening of human rights record and of democratic and liberal credentials, the key role of Turkey in the Eurasian space and in managing migration flows towards Europe, as well as the crisis of the EU itself and, to some extent, the internal challenges to its liberal order.

With all these issues in mind, it is clear that the road to EU membership for Turkey is now in fact blocked. The EU should find a way to codify its reaction to the consolidation of autocracy in Turkey and show that pre-accession process is not a one-way street. The EU should not wait for President Erdoğan to take the initiative and organise his own 'Trexit', but urgently make a move towards a suspension or termination of accession process of Turkey. This decision should, on the one hand, send a clear signal to other candidate countries and reinstate credibility in enlargement policy, and on the other, prepare an after Erdoğan situation for Turkey in a foreseeable future.
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Does Turkey belong in the European Union?

DEJAN JOVIĆ

Turkey’s road to EU has been a very long one, but it seems that Turkey is today farther away from EU than ever in the last 25 years. Thus, my tentative answer to the main question of this panel is more no than yes, and regrettably so.

Both sides missed the opportunities provided by relatively uncontroversial and potentially productive periods of their bilateral relations. Following major changes in the international structure of Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the EU focused its attention on East-Central Europe. In addition, the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s provided a new focus (on the Western Balkans) for NATO in Europe. The EU enlargement concerned mainly former Communist states (with the exception of Malta and Cyprus) and did not include Turkey, despite the country having been a relatively stable democracy and a solid ally of the US and the West throughout the Cold War. The political elite in Turkey, which was prepared to risk a loss of popularity in order to introduce reforms that were necessary for the accession to the EU, has felt that this was unfair. As a Turkish general once said: had Turkey been a Communist country, it would have entered EU by now. The sense of being treated unfairly was only multiplied with the 2004 big bang enlargement, which included Cyprus although the key issue of the reintegration of the island had not been resolved, and despite Turkish Cypriots voting in favour of the Annan plan. All this has contributed to a disappointment with the EU in Turkey. In conjunction with the impression that the West had not done enough to protect Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) during the horrendous war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995), these arguments and justifications provided fertile ground for a change of direction in Turkish foreign policy. It is the EU’s lack of enthusiasm (if not of interest) with regard to Turkish EU membership, as well as several unfulfilled semi-promises over a long period of time (since 1963) that is to blame – at least in part – for today’s standstill in the EU-Turkish relationship.

The other side of the story is connected to changes in Turkey itself, including some fundamental turnabouts in both domestic and foreign policy, as well as regarding the politics of identity. During the Cold War, despite challenges such as the crisis in Cyprus, military interventions in Turkey and insufficient (and at some moments even completely suspended) democracy, Turkey was a...
firm and important Western ally. With Norway, it was the only other NATO member that bordered the USSR. Its foreign policy had only one major objective: rapprochement with the West. Several attempts to challenge the pro-Western (also: secularist, pro-modernization and basically – if not perfectly – democratic) orientation of the country were met with the swift and occasionally brutal response by the deep state (security apparatus, military elite, judicial authorities, media elite etc.). Turkey's EU membership application – which was also linked to an attempt to find an alternative to the sponsor-client relationship with the US, but within the broad framework of Western orientation of the country – was one of the pillars of the country’s foreign policy.

However, the end of the Cold War provided other opportunities for Turkey. The dissolution of the USSR enabled for the first time a serious influence in several Central Asian states that were culturally close to Turkey and presented good trade opportunities for the Turkish industrial sector. Crises in nearby countries and regions (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and above all the Middle East) made Turkey more, not less, important from a security point of view than it was even during the Cold War. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s book Strategic Depth provides a coherent – and from a policy perspective important – insight into this new strategic thinking. Instead of uni-directionality, Turkish foreign policy now became based on the concept of multi-directionality. The politics of zero problems with neighbours (which never materialized) re-directed the focus of Turkish policy-making towards the country’s neighbours, with an ambition to create a new mega-region in which Turkey would play the role of mega-regional power. The crisis of authoritarian regimes and hopes raised by the (relatively short-lived) Arab Spring provided an opportunity for Turkey to present itself as a potential role-model for new democracies. Davutoğlu’s strategy (largely shared by Prime Minister and then President Erdoğan) boosted Turkish ambitions in foreign policy. Coupled with fast economic growth, as well as with rising self-confidence and popularity of its populist leadership, the new Turkey began to see its former policy of pleasing the West as unacceptable and humiliating from the point of its newly reformulated key national interests. Although Turkey never abandoned its pro-EU foreign policy orientation, it modified its relative importance with regards to other foreign-policy objectives. Instead of being the main objective, EU membership initially became one of several objectives. In a second step, Turkish leaders began to behave almost as though they were no longer really interested in their country joining the Union. The latest development in EU-Turkey relations includes sharp criticism of Europe, as well as insults directed at some of its key member-states, in particular Germany, Austria and the Netherlands for being hostile to Turkey, or even the capitals of fascism and/or xenophobia. At the same time, a dramatic worsening of human rights record and of the democratic and liberal credentials of Erdogan’s regime after the attempted coup of 2016 has provided plenty of evidence that Turkey is now moving into the opposite direction to the one requested by the EU under its shared values and democratisation framework.

Three other important factors are shaping the EU-Turkey relationship, and thus should be included in any policy analysis:

1. The refugee crisis. This crisis made Turkey an important player in the Eurasian space, and gave it an opportunity to become a de facto the veto player by using and spreading fears of refugees. This sentiment has already (often
with no good reason) been seeded by anti-liberal, xenophobic and nationalist-conservative forces in almost all EU member-states. Turkey is using this threat as a bargaining chip in any negotiations with the EU. This will remain the case in the future, for as long as Europe does not overcome its own fears and rejects/defeats nationalist and anti-immigration policies.

2. Crisis of the European Union – and, to some degree, the crisis of European liberal-democratic (with emphasis on liberal) order. The crisis of the EU has made the Union less attractive to all candidate states. The magnet of EU (or its soft power) is now significantly less powerful – and thus efficient – than a decade or two ago. On the contrary, there is now a relatively new phenomenon: the soft power of authoritarianism. This is especially the case with two semi-European authoritarian regimes and personalities: Putin in Russia and Erdoğan in Turkey. However, it is also visible in the support for Trump’s anti-liberal politics, as well as in the new attractiveness of the Chinese model, and even Iran. The rise of anti-liberal parties and movements, as well as the strengthening of anti-liberal discourses in public opinion can be used (and is used) as a ‘justification’ of anti-liberal and anti-EU policies in Turkey. In addition, Brexit has left Turkey without the most vocal advocate of an EU enlargement that would include also Turkey. Britain was an advocate of such an enlargement: Germany and France are not.

3. Autocratic ambitions of President Erdoğan – which are evident in his initiative to change the Constitution, and in his desire to stay in power at least until 2029, if not for good. This is connected with Erdogan’s vision of himself as being the new Atatürk, the radical (almost revolutionary) reformer of Turkey. Thus, he would like to introduce new reforms by the 100th anniversary of the Republic (in 2023) and to preside even beyond that date, so that he can fully control the consolidation of Erdoganism.

With all these elements in mind, we can argue that the road to EU membership for Turkey is now in fact blocked. There is no will to unblock it among the political leaders of Europe, nor in the public opinion. Turkish politics under President Erdogan is not helping – on the contrary, it appears out of touch with liberal democracy and thus more distant from EU now than ever before. Instead of simulating that business as usual is still possible, the focus should be on how to improve the relationship between EU and Turkey, not on how to unblock the accession process. Changes are possible only after Erdogan, and under two conditions: a) that there is an after Erdogan situation in the foreseeable future, and b) that EU survives until then.
For more than 18 years the annual Dubrovnik Dialogue-Conference in Cavtat has been a forum for parliamentarians from South-East-Europe. This year’s event will focus on the current challenges of the European Union. With the decision for a Brexit, for the first time a member of the European Union will leave. The accession process with Turkey, at the same time, has come into a very difficult phase, and might come to a halt. What does this mean for South-East-Europe? How does it affect the accession process and cooperation in the region? Does Turkey belong in the European Union?

Friday, April 7th 2017

by 17:00 Arrival of Participants in Cavtat, Check-in at Hotel Croatia

18:00 Welcome and Introduction, Conference Hall “Bobara” (5th floor)
Max Brändle, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Zagreb

18:15 Keynote Speech
Tonino Picula, Member of the European Parliament (Croatia)

18:45 Discussion Moderated by Max Brändle, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Zagreb with:
Tonino Picula, Member of the European Parliament (Croatia)
Dušan Reljić, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Brussels
Christoph Zöpel, Special Adviser to the PES President on Central and Eastern Europe

19:30 Reception on the Balcony

20:00 Dinner at the Restaurant “Steakhouse” (-2nd floor below the reception)

Saturday, April 8th 2017

09:00 Welcome Address, Conference Hall “Bobara” (5th floor)
Peđa Grbin, Member of Parliament (Croatia)

PANEL 1: HOW DOES BREXIT AFFECT THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS IN SOUTH-EAST-EUROPE?

Chairwoman: Petra Kammerevert, Member of the European Parliament (Germany)

09:15 Input: Steven Blockmans, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels

09:35 Invited Comment by Gabriela Cretu, Member of Parliament (Romania)

09:50 Discussion

10:45 Coffee Break
Panel 2: The EU Accession Process in South-East-Europe

Chairman: Hansjörg Brey, Southeast Europe Association, Munich

11:15 Input: Goran Svilanović, Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), Sarajevo

11:35 Invited Comment by Tanja Fajon, Member of the European Parliament (Slovenia), Vice-President of the S&D-Group

11:50 Discussion

12:30 Lunch at the Restaurant “Tihi salon” (5th floor)

Panel 3: Does Turkey Belong in the EU?

Chairman: Knut Fleckenstein, Member of the European Parliament (Germany), Vice-President of the S&D-Group

14:00 Input: Dejan Jović, University of Zagreb

14:20 Invited Comment by Zeynep Altıok, Member of the Turkish Parliament

14:35 Discussion

15:30 Closing Remarks

16:00 End of the Panel Discussions

16:30 Meeting Point for the Transport to the Historic Center of Dubrovnik at the Hotel Reception

17:00 Reception at the University of Dubrovnik Campus (Ulica Branitelja Dubrovnika 41, Dubrovnik)

18:00 Optional: Guided Political Tour

19:00 Dinner at the Restaurant “Posat” in the Historic Center of Dubrovnik (Uz Posat 1, Dubrovnik)

21:30 Transfer to the Hotel

Sunday, April 9th 2017

Opportunity for an Exchange of Views and Departure of Participants.

The conference language will be English. Simultaneous interpretation will be provided: English - Croatian / Serbian / Bosnian.
About the authors

Matteo Bonomi is currently Visiting Fellow at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Brussels’ Office, and policy analyst for Populari, an independent think tank based in Sarajevo. He holds a PhD in Politics, Human Rights and Sustainability from the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna in Pisa, Italy.

Dejan Jović is Professor of International Politics at University of Zagreb and Visiting Professor at University of Belgrade. He received his PhD from LSE and worked (from 2000 – 2010) as Lecturer in Politics at University of Stirling, Scotland, UK. In 2010-14 he was Chief Political Analyst and Advisor to President of Croatia, Ivo Josipović. In 2014-16 he was President of the Board of Croatian Institute for Development and International Relations. Professor Jović is currently Editor-in-Chief of Croatian Political Science Review.

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